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CURIA REGIS: SOME COMMENTS ON THE
DIVINE RIGHT OF KINGS AND COURTS "TO
SAY WHAT THE LAW IS"*
Philip B. Kurland* *
Sir William Holdsworth, in his monumental History of English
Law, tells us:
As Mr. Turner remarks, "from the time of the Conqueror there
must always have been a curia coram rege of some sort. We cannot
imagine a time when cases were not reserved to the king and judicial
advisers at his side, cases which concerned the king himself and his
peace; nor can we imagine a time when other cases were not referred
to him for special consideration. Such reservation and reference
were part of the burden of kingship .... In ordinary matters,
whether civil or criminal, ample justice could have been done by the
local courts. . .. "
Sir William, later in his book, added:
It is quite clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the undifferen-
tiated Curia Regis of the twelfth century was marked by two of the
chief characteristics which we associate with a court of equity. Pro-
ceedings were begun by petition to the king for his interference; and
that interference might result in remedies which, by reason both of
their character and their method of enforcement, were, as Professor
Adams has said, "outside of, and in violation of, the ordinary system
of justice which prevailed throughout the Anglo-Norman
state. ... 2
This description of the procedure and powers of the Curia Regis
* The Isaac Marks Memorial Lecture, delivered at The College of Law, The University of
Arizona, in Tucson, Arizona on 24 March 1981.
** William R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago; Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B., 1942, Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1944, Harvard; LL.D.,
1977, Notre Dame.
1. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 30 (7th ed. 1955).
2. Id at 446-47.
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surely has a familiar ring to those concerned with the Supreme Court
of the United States and how it goes about its business. But it should
be remembered that the Curia's business, as Holdsworth said, was "un-
differentiated." The royal court was not confined to judicial business.
There was, then, no distinction between the exercise of executive, legis-
lative, and judicial powers. Not even the imagination of a Montes-
quieu could extract a principle of separation of powers from the
operation of the king's government of that time.3 "L'Etat, c'est moi," as
Louis XIV put it.4 The Curia Regis was the Crown, and it operated
without the constraints of constitution, of legislation, or of judicial
precedents. Its judgments were ad hoc and based primarily on notions
of what the royal court thought to be best for the interests of the king,
including the preservation of the King's Peace.
In theory, our government, unlike that of our English forebears,
derives not from the divine right of kings which found in God's will the
source of its lawmaking function, but from the mandate of the people,
expressed primarily in written constitutions. It was intended to be what
John Adams, in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, called "a
government of laws and not of men."5 And, however ready we may be
to recognize the weakness of the Adams conception because we know
that laws are but the tools of men,6 we generally accede to the proposi-
tion that we are all to be governed by the same preestablished rules and
not by the whim of those charged with executing those rules. In his
phrase, Adams epitomized what has come to be known in the Anglo-
American world as "the rule of law.' 7 The difference between rule by
law and rule by fiat or discretion is largely what distinguishes the de-
mocracies of the West from the governments of most of the rest of the
world.
The American Constitution purports to provide for the distribu-
tion of government power as well as its containment. And, whether
originally intended or not, the Supreme Court from the beginning as-
3. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1750).
4. According to the OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS, the remark was made to the
Parlement de Paris, 13 April 1655. It cites DULAURE, HIsTOiRE DE PARIS as its source.
5. H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 110 (8th ed. 1968).
6. The conception of a government by laws dominated the thoughts of those who
founded this Nation and designed its Constitution, although they knew as well as the
belittlers of the conception that laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by men.
To that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositaries of law, who by
their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of
private interest may reasonably be expected to be 'as free, impartial, and independent as
the lot of humanity will admit.' So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on
securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary safe-
guards and prestige.
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
7. See G. MARSHALL, CONSTITtrIONAL THEORY 137-39 (1971).
[Vol. 23
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sumed the role, not of keeper of the King's conscience, but of keeper of
the rule of law as embodied in the Constitution. It has been suggested
that this function of the Supreme Court-the function of judicial re-
view-derives from necessity rather than plan:8 the necessity to confine
the other two branches of the government to their respective spheres,
the necessity to make the Constitution meaningful and not a mere
"piece of paper." But it should also be remembered, as John Marshall
told us in Marbury, that "courts, as well as other departments, are
bound by that instrument."9
That we must all be grateful to the Court for performing its duty
as guardian of the Constitution from the origins of our Nation down to
the present, none should gainsay. I venture that no governmental body
in history has maintained so unblemished an escutcheon, free of venal-
ity, and personal vindictiveness, as the Supreme Court of the United
States. This, of course, is not to say that the Court has been free of self-
aggrandizement or of partisanship, but its partisanship has been for
causes and not for persons. Neither can it be denied, however, that the
love of power is no less fearsome than "the love of money."10 And, if
we must applaud the Court, we need not abstain from critical examina-
tion of its behavior. Professional criticism affords the only form of ju-
dicial accountability. The Constitution is the "supreme law of the
land," and the Supreme Court is an institution of government, but the
Justices, as Lord Bryce told us some years ago, "are only men."1
Being men and not Platonic Guardians or "aristocrats," 2 the Jus-
tices, who have the special duty of expounding the Constitution, have
no special capacities, training, or experience in doing so that is not
shared by most, if not all, lawyers, whose craft they purport to express.
For in the performance of its functions, the pretense, at least, is that the
8. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
10. 1 Timothy 6:10.
11. 1 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 274 (1917 ed.).
12. Chief Justice Bird of the Supreme Court of California has suggested that courts are "the
last aristocratic part of a democratic s stem." D. BRODER, CHANGING OF THE GUARD 248 (1980).
In this she follows de Tocqueville: 'If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I
should reply without hesitation that it is not among the rich, who are united by no common tie,
but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar." I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 278 (P. Bradley ed. 1945). Tocqueville established his meaning of aristocracy in the
context of his statement; Bird did not. It would be interesting to learn which, if any, of the follow-
ing descriptions would most closely fit her idea of "aristocratic": 1. "Aristocracy is that form of
government in which education and discipline are qualifications for suffrage or office holding."
ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, bk. I, at 2. "There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds for
this are virtue and talents." 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS (Cappon ed. 1959). 3. "An aris-
tocracy is a combination of many powerful men, for the purpose of maintaining and advancing
their own particular interests." J. COOPER, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRAT ch. X (1838). 4. "The
aristocrat is the democrat ripe and gone to seed." R. EMERSON, REPRESENTATIVE MEN CI. VI
(1850).
1981]
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Court, like the other two branches of government, has but two sources
for its judgments: the Constitution and congressional legislation.
Small, indeed, is the number of Justices who are or will be marked
by history as great jurists. Most of those who have served could have
said, with at least as much reason, what Mr. Justice Roberts wrote upon
his resignation from the Court: "I have no illusions about my judicial
career. But one can only do what he can. Who am I to revile the good
God that he did not make me a Marshall, a Taney, a Bradley, a
Holmes, a Brandeis or a Cardozo?"' 3 Others may choose a slightly
different list of judicial greats, but few would expand the list beyond a
half-dozen. The strength of the Court must derive from its collegial
powers rather than from those of individual Justices. Historically, the
Supreme Court has never collectively risen to the heights of its most
brilliant Justices; nor has it ever been collectively reduced to the level
of its weakest ones. The Court is a collegial body and its product has
usually reflected the mean of its collective talent. For only to the de-
gree that its opinions are the consequence of deliberation and truly rep-
resent a consensus of the Court can it adequately perform its functions
of definition and guidance.
It is the Court's lawmaking function by "construction" and
"deconstruction" of the Constitution that I purport to address here. By
"construction" of the Constitution, I mean the Court's derivation of a
rule of law from the text, context, and structure of the Constitution
itself. By "deconstruction," a word I have borrowed from academic
literary critics 4 and probably have misshaped to my own ends, I mean
not what the Court takes from the Constitution but what it puts into it.
Deconstruction may be analogized to "salting" a mine: the only gold
to be gotten from it is that which has been put into it. (I do not propose
to examine here the Court's role as expounder of the meaning of con-
gressional legislation rather than the Constitution except to say that the
Weber opinion 5 is more than adequate demonstration that where
there is a wilfulness, there is a waywardness.)
Not long ago, Geoffrey Marshall wrote in The Times Literary Sup-
plement: "English constitutional conventions are, as G.H.L. LeMay
says in The Victorian Constitution ('like the procreation of eels'),
vague, slippery and mysterious. Precisely how they are generated is
somewhat unclear; how they are recognized excites differences of opin-
13. Quoted in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 517 (P. Kurland ed. 1970)
(hereinafter Kurland).
14. See H. BLOOM, P. DEMAN, J. DERRIDA, G. HARTMAN, & J. MILLER, DECONSTRUCTION
AND CRITIclsMpassim (1980).
15. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). See generally Meltzer, The Weber
Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrinination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L.
Rnv. 423 (1980).
[Vol. 23
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ion and how they change and disappear is a matter of dispute."' 16
American constitutional conventions are equally vague, slippery, and
mysterious. But there are no longer questions as to how they are gener-
ated, how they are recognized, how they change, or how they disap-
pear. The Supreme Court of the United States generates them,
recognizes them, changes them, and abolishes them. We have been
told by no less an authority than Charles Evans Hughes that the Con-
stitution is whatever the Justices of the Supreme Court say it is.17 Nev-
ertheless, there is now a heated debate among academic lawyers over
whether constitutional adjudication must depend upon the meaning to
be given the text of the document in the context of history, structure,
and prior judicial construction, or whether there are other sources from
which our constitutional law may as well be derived. 8
In his preeminent textbook on constitutional law, which is dis-
guised as a casebook, Professor Gerald Gulther has put the issues this
way:
To what extent must the Court confine itself to the text and history of
the relevant constitutional provision? To what extent may it rely on
inferences from the structures and relationships established by the
basic document?. .. To what extent is the Court authorized to im-
plement values derived from sources outside the written document-
e.g., the society's political and moral values, or the Justices' personal
ones?19
Gunther continues:
Typically, that debate is now couched as a battle between "interpreti-
vism" and "noninterpretivism"-between the view that judges can
only enforce norms stated or clearly implicit in the Constitution and
the position that courts can legitimately go beyond those sources.
Examples of "noninterpretivist" positions include the claim that the
Supreme Court has the obligation to articulate the changing content
of the nation's fundamental values and that it is charged with evolv-
16. THE TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 18, 1980, at 67, col. 1.
17. "We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is, and the
judiciary is the safeguard of our liberty and of our property under the Constitution." ADDRESSES
AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 185-86 (2d ed. 1916).
18. A representative, but far from exhaustive list, includes: R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY (1977); A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); J.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980); R. DWORI.N, TAK-
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); L. LUSKY, BY WHAT
RIGHT? (1975); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 4mendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I
(1971); Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980);
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Levinson, "The Con-
stitution"and.4merican Civil Rei'gion, 1979 SuP. C. REv. 123; Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Real-
irt Tradition, 82 YALE LJ. 227 (1972); Monaghan, Of "'Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405 (1977); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princoles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
19. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (10th ed. 1980).
1981]
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ing and applying the society's fundamental principles. 20
(You will pardon me, I trust, if I frequently prefer to use the word
"construction" where my colleagues refer to "interpretivism" and the
word "deconstruction" where they speak of "noninterpretivism." My
tongue ties too readily over the more pedantic expressions.)
The debate, I should say, is not over what the Supreme Court does
in its constitutional adjudication but over what it should do. The ques-
tion is not whether the Court engages in deconstruction--everyone
seems to recognize that it does, at least from time to time-but rather
whether it ought to do so.
If we look to John Marshall's classic justification for judicial re-
view as expressed in Marbury v. Madison ,21 or Hamilton's 78th Federal-
ist, there should be no doubt about the validity of the "interpretivist"
position. But to resort to so basic a judicial precedent, or so authorita-
tive a contemporary text on the original meaning of the Constitution, is
itself an act of interpretivism and, therefore, begs the question rather
than answers it. My own view is that deconstruction makes nonsense
of the concept of a written constitution. But as to deconstruction, I am
in the position of Thomas Reed Powell's Vermont farmer who, when
asked whether he believed in Baptism, replied, "Believe in it hell; I've
seen it done."
Of course, to say that I believe that the Constitution must be the
source for constitutional adjudication is not to suggest that the duties of
the Court are mechanical or that an examination of its origins, its
words, and its structure will afford unequivocal answers to every prob-
lem that comes to the Court for resolution. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
admonition about statutory construction is equally appropriate to con-
stitutional construction: "The notion that because the words . . . are
plain, its meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplication.
It is a wooden English doctrine of rather recent vintage. . . to which
lip service has on occasion been given here, but which since the days of
John Marshall, this Court has rejected, especially in practice."'22 The
language, history, and clausal relationships give adequate play for
judgment on the part of the Justices. Constitutional opinions, as Mr.
Justice Brandeis so often told us, are not chiseled in stone.23 But
neither is the Constitution a ball of clay to be molded to the desires of
the judges. The Constitution and its history impose boundaries-what
the current jargon terms "parameters"-not only on the legislative and
20. Id
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
22. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943).
23. E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928); United States v. Moreland, 258
U.S. 433, 451 (1922).
[Vol. 23
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executive branches but on the judicial branch as well. But it is not my
purpose here to explicate my own views on the proper mode of consti-
tutional adjudication.
I would point out, however, that while the fervor of the present
debate suggests that the jurisprudential question of interpretivism ver-
sus noninterpretivism is comparatively new, it is in fact a contest that
has been waged from the beginning of the Court's history and before;
only the labels have changed from time to time. What we have in the
recent literature is old whine in new bottles. The central question is
even hoarier than the anecdote about the Vermont farmer and may be
recognized by some of you under the old rubrics of "higher law," "nat-
ural law," "substantive due process," "realism," and "preferred posi-
tions," to mention just a few.
Thus in 1798, in the classic case of Calder v. Bull,24 Justices Chase
and Iredell-in dicta to be sure-argued about whether there was a
"natural law" superior to the Constitution. 5 And Mr. Justice William
24. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
25. Mr. Justice Chase stated:
There are certain vital principles in ourfree Republican governments, which will deter-
mine and overrule an apparent andflagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize
manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal liberty, or
privatepropery, for the protection whereof the government was established. An ACT of
the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the greatfirstprincples of the social
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation
of a law in governments established on express compact, and on republican princples,
must be determined in the nature of the power, on which it is founded.
Id at 388 (emphasis in original).
Mr. Justice Iredell argued:
If any act of Congress, or of the legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provi-
sions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is
of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear
and urgent case. If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of
any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their constitu-
tional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their
judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are
regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the
subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the
opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.
There are then but two lights, in which the subject can be viewed: 1st. If the Legislature
pursue the authority delegated to them, their acts are valid. 2d. If they transgress the
boundaries of that authority, their acts are invalid. In the former case, they exercise the
discretion vested in them by the people, to whom alone they are responsible for the
faithful discharge of their trust: but, in the latter case, they violate a fundamental law,
which must be our guide, whenever we are called upon, as judges, to determine the
validity of a legislative act.
Id at 399.
It might be added that Mr. Justice Chase's notion of the superiority of his own judgment over
that of the Constitution and the Congress was, in part, what earned him his place in history as the
only Supreme Court Justice ever to have been impeached, although he was not convicted. See R.
ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC passim
(1971).
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Johnson, in Fletcher v. Peck26 and Mills v. Duryee,2 7 adumbrated the
supremacy of natural law.
When Professor Gunther, almost five hundred pages after his
notes on noninterpretivism from which I have already quoted, comes to
deal with the problem of "substantive due process," he makes it very
clear that the issues are the same:
These substantive due process cases, old and new, raise common
issues: Are these decisions from Lochner v. New York [198 U.S. 45
(1950)] to Griswold v. Connecticut [381 U.S. 479 (1965)] and Roe v.
Wade [410 U.S. 113 (1973)], justifiable as interpretations of the Con-
stitution? Are the fundamental values identified in such cases plausi-
ble extrapolations from constitutional text, history, or structure? Or
are they ultimately extraconstitutional, noninterpretive judicial infu-
sions? ... Are there basic values-moral, social, or economic-that
truly reflect a national consensus? Even if there are such values, does
the existence of a consensus justify reading them into the Constitu-
tion? Do the Court's fundamental value adjudications in fact rest on
an adequately widespread consensus?. . . Or do they ultimately re-
flect nothing more than the beliefs of a majority of the Justices at a
particular time? Are fundamental value adjudications unacceptable
if the Court cannot demonstrate an adequate link to constitutional
text, history, or structure? Is it possible to state a principled, disci-
plined "fundamental values" approach that safeguards adequately
against merely subjective judicial lawmaking?28
For me, these questions are rhetorical. But these are the questions
addressed in the fast-growing legal literature on the subject. It will be
recalled that it was in Lochner that Mr. Justice Holmes remarked in
dissent, "The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics."29 Of today's decisions, it might be said that the four-
teenth amendment does not enact Professor John Rawls's Theory of
Justice. Both statements are equally right or equally wrong, and I
think that Holmes was probably wrong. Spencer encapsulated the judi-
cial zeitgeist of the early twentieth century as Rawls has encapsulated
that of the latter part of this century: for Spencerians, liberty, even at
cost of gross inequity; for Rawlsians, or at least for his epigone, equal-
ity, even at the cost of almost any liberty.
26. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Johnson suggested that a statute revoking a grant was
unconstitutional, not because it violated the contract clause, but "[on a general] principle which
would impose laws even on the Deity." Id at 143.
27. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). Here Johnson retreated a little, suggesting that legislative
power was greater than that of divine law. "There are certain eternal principles of justice which
never ought to be dispensed with, and which courts of justice never can dispense with but when
compelled by positive statute." Id at 486.
28. G. GUNTHER, supra note 19, at 502-03.
29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 23
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There is, however, no showing that the judiciary's notion of funda-
mental values originating outside the Constitution bears any resem-
blance to the values preferred by the majority of the people. In any
event, the expression of society's notion of fundamental values would
more readily be reflected in the behavior of the legislative and execu-
tive branches-the democratic branches of government-and thus
make the invocation of such a judicial power redundant. Indeed, it has
been proposed that the Supreme Court's primary function is to protect
individuals and minorities from legislatively imposed values of the so-
ciety at large.
Somehow, and perhaps because I received my legal education
when legal realism was at its apex, the language of legal realism seems
more compelling to me than that of our contemporary jurisprudes. The
realists told me that each of the three branches of government exerts
political power and that the realists chose to support the branch that
came to the conclusions most satisfying to themselves.3" For them, per-
sonal predilections guided both the Justices and their critics.
I suspect that the words "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism"
are used in the current literature because "substantive due process" and
"natural law" have been so thoroughly discredited. If the phoenix is to
rise again it must be in the disguise of a new bird; perhaps a turkey
would do.
Two questions within the current debate are far more interesting
to me than whether the Court does or should indulge in constitutional
deconstruction. The first, which I propose to examine, is if the Court
engages in noninterpretivism, as it surely does, why does it not do so
candidly and openly? The second, which I propose to bypass, is if not
30. Cf. Roche, The Expatriation Cases.- "Breathes There the Man, with Soul so Dead...?,
1963 Sup. C. REv. 325, 326, n.4, saying:
In the forlorn hope of quashing in advance charges of inconsistency, let me set out my
position on judicial review in constitutional cases: (1) On the theoretical plane I do not
consider Supreme Court review of policy matters to be democratic in character. See
Roche, Courts and Rights 93-105 (1961). (2) As a participant in American society in
1963-somewhat removed from the abstract world of democratic political theory-I am
delighted when the Supreme Court takes action against "bad" policy on whatever consti-
tutional basis it can establish or invent. In short, I accept Aristotle's dictum that the
essence of political tragedy is for the good to be opposed in the name of the perfect.
Thus, while I wish with Professors Wechsler and Kurland, inter alios, that Supreme
Court Justices would proceed on the same principles as British judges, it does not unset-
tle or irritate-me-when they behave like Americans. Had I been a member of the.Court
in 1954, I would unhesitatingly have supported the constitutional death-sentence on ra-
cial segregation, even though it seems to me that in a properly ordered democratic soci-
ety this should be a task for the legislature. To paraphrase St. Augustine, in this world
one must take his breaks where he finds them. (3) Finally, I insist that the task of the
historian (Professors Black and Calm to the contrary notwithstanding) is not to fortify
useful myths, but to attempt to plumb the realities of the past.
For an examination of American realist jurisprudence, see G. CASPER, JURISTISCHER REALISMUS
AND POLrrIsCHE THEORIE IM AMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSDENKEN (1967).
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from constitutional text, its history, its structure, or prior judicial pro-
nouncements, where are the appropriate principles for guidance to be
found? On the second question, suffice it here to quote from Lord Pol-
lock in a letter to Holmes: "In the Middle Ages natural law was re-
garded as the senior branch of divine law and therefore had to be
treated as infallible (but there was no infallible way of knowing what it
was)." 3'
The demand on the Court for frank recognition of its deconstruc-
tive methods is not new. For example, Professor Felix Frankfurter, as
he then was, wrote in 1923:
Granted that the power of judicial review in this widest field of
social policy is to be retained, its true nature should be frankly recog-
nized. Since the nine Justices are molders of policy instead of imper-
sonal vehicles of revealed truth, the security of the power which they
exercise demands that, in this realm of law, the most sensitive field of
social policy and legal control, the judicial process should become a
conscious process. The Justices will then recognize that the "Consti-
tution" which they "interpret" is to a large measure the interpreta-
tion of their own experience, their 'judgment about practical
matters," their ideal picture of the social order.32
Judge Learned Hand put the same point more pithily, as was almost
always the case, when he said, "If we do need a third chamber it should
appear for what it is, and not as the interpreter of inscrutable princi-
ples."33 Note that both these eminent jurists not only suggested the
desirability of candor but recognized that the bases for judgment were
personal evaluations by the Justices of what they thought to be the best
solutions to the social, economic, and political issues that came before
them. Note, too, that these are the words of the two most eminent judi-
cial representatives of the school of judicial restraint.
Both of the quoted remarks, however, were extrajudicial utter-
ances. Neither in their own judicial opinions nor in those of the
Supreme Court generally have I found any equally candid expression
of the view that it is not the Constitution, its history, its structure, or
prior judicial construction, but a personal evaluation in the light of
their own experience that should lead Justices to their constitutional
judgments.3 4 This failure may be mine, attributable either to my igno-
31. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERs 275 (M. Howe ed. 1941).
32. Quotedin Kurland, supra note 13, at 119-20.
33. L. HAND, supra note 8, at 70.
34. Cf. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting):
As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions of policy into
the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or how mischievous I may
deem their disregard.... It can never be emphasized too much that one's own opinion
about the wisdom or evil of a law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one's
duty on the bench.
[Vol. 23
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rance of what in fact exists or my unwillingness to see what has been
plainly written. But I think it cannot be denied that the Court has
rarely been candid about its deconstructionist behavior.
It is true, nevertheless, that the Court frequently signals its decon-
struction without openly avowing it. Thus, whenever an opinion
quotes Marshall's dictum in M'Culloch v. Maryland35-"[w]e must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding" 36 --you can be
sure that the Court will be throwing the constitutional text, its history,
and its structure to the winds-in reaching its conclusion. Witness, for
example, Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,37 which buried the con-
tract clause until only a term or two ago, or Mr. Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Bakke v. Board ofRegents,38 which would suspend the Con-
stitution until things got better.
Another signal of deconstruction is the citation of the renowned
Holmes dictum in Missouri v. Holland:39
[w]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have
been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters....
The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole expe-
rience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.40
Once more this means that the Constitution is out the window. History
has not changed the principles of the Constitution, although it has
changed the subjects to which the constitutional principles are applica-
ble.4' The one historical change necessarily reflected in constitutional
adjudication is the change in the role of government from that of a
policeman to that of a prime mover in the affairs of men. Because of
the great expansion of government, there is a vastly wider field for the
id at 647.
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
36. Id at 407.
37. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
38. 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently.").
39. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
40. Id at 433.
41. See Mr. Justice Brewer's opinion in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905):
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That
which it meant when adopted it means now. Being a grant of powers to a government its
language is general, and~aschanges come in social and political life it embraces in its ....
grasp all new conditions which are within the scope of the powers in terms conferred. In
other words, while the powers granted do not change, they apply from generation to
generation to all things to which they are in their nature applicable. This in no manner
abridges the fact of its changeless nature and meaning. Those things which are within its
grants of power, as those grants were understood when made, are still within them, and
those things not within them remain still excluded.
Id at 448-49.
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play of constitutional adjudications under the service state of today
than there was in the time of the Federalists and Jeffersonians. But the
principles of allocation of power and the restraints on its exercise have
not been altered by history.
A third signal of the Court's indulgence in noninterpretivism is its
invocation of phrases that are no part of the Constitution as if they
were to be found there. I call this deconstruction by label. You know
the phrases: "the right to contract,""n "freedom of association,"43 "the
right to travel,"' "the right of privacy,"45 are some of them. Genera-
tions of laws students have grown up believing that some or all of these
words were among those framed by the Founding Fathers in 1787.
Perhaps the most candid of these subterfuges for replacing the
words of the Constitution by the will of the Justices is that which pur-
ports to resort to original intent even as it rejects it. It is that construc-
tion which says that a particular term or phrase was intended to be
without substantive content-that the Court was given a blank check to
be filled in however it wished. The only restraint on this discretion is
that there must be sufficient political capital in the Court's account so
that it is not returned by the people marked "N.S.F." As the King told
Alice, "If there is no meaning in it, that saves a world of trouble, you
know, as we needn't try to find any."'4 6 This, you will recall, was the
Court's reading of history in relation to school desegregation in Brown
v. Board of Education,47 to which it was led by no less a scholar than
the late Professor Alexander M. Bickel.48
The foremost proponent of this "empty vessel" school-to change
the metaphor-was Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who often voiced the view
that the commerce clause, the due process clause, and the equal protec-
tion clause were among those whose content was left to be created by
the Justices. For example, he once said, "Due process is not a mechani-
cal instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a delicate
process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment
by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the
process."' 49  Judges, "whose preoccupation is with [constitutional
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
43. E.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,460 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957).
44. Eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
629 (1969).
45. Eg., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
46. See L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING
GLASS 115 (Schocken ed. 1978).
47. 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
48. See Bickel, The Original Understanding andthe Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. I
(1955).
49. Quoted in Kurland, supra note 13, at 336-37.
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clauses like these] should be compounded of the faculties that are de-
manded of the historian and the philosopher and the prophet ...
[with] poetic sensibilities. ... 1 (Perhaps Frankfurter thought this
was a self-portrait; surely he did not believe that any of his brethren
met the standard he bespoke. And, aside from thee and me, what law-
yer does?) It has always come as a surprise to my students that it was
Frankfurter who was the deconstructionist and Black the interpre-
tivist,5" although both claimed to eschew personal values as a guide to
judgment.
The question remains, if the Court indulges in deconstruction, as
everyone seems to agree that it does, why will it not reveal the manner
by which it reaches its conclusions rather than concealing it by purport-
ing to find its answers in the Constitution? There are many hypotheses
offered to explain this phenomenon, but there is little other than specu-
lation to support any of them.
One explanation is to be found in an anecdote related by Ronald
Steel in his new and excellent book Walter Lopmann and the American
Century. Speaking of Walter Lippmann's new bride, who had come to
Washington with him to reside in the House of Truth, which was
stocked with the bright young men-mostly from Harvard-who came
to Washington in World War I to help preserve the world for democ-
racy, Steel writes:
One of her greatest admirers was Justice Holmes, who used to come
from the Court chambers in the late afternoon to play double soli-
taire with her. Once during a game she gently pointed out to him
that he was cheating. 'But it's such a small thing, my dear,' he sighed
through his great drooping mustache, 'and no one will suffer from it
but me.' 52
The argument may well be that the Court believes that its exercise
of deconstruction is "a small thing" from which none will suffer but
those who indulge in it. As Frankfurter once wrote for the Court, in a
different context, "Fictions have played an important and sometimes
fruitful part in the development of the law; and the Equal Protection
Clause is not a command of candor." 53 Nor, it may be added, does any
other part of the Constitution contain such a command except by
deconstruction. This approach, however, was inconsistent with Frank-
furter's more frequent admonitions that democracy requires that the
governors keep the governed accurately informed of their behavior so
50. Id at 504.
51. See the respective opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Black in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 59, 68 (1947); H. BLACK, A CONSTrrUTIONAL FAITH (1968).
52. R. STEEL, WALTER LippMANN AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 121 (1980).
53. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940).
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that the people might exercise their ultimate authority over their gov-
ernment . 4 Much governmental authority, however, is based on
fictions, and that of the Supreme Court would seem to be no exception.
It is a pretense that presidential nominees are chosen by the people and
elected by the Electoral College. It is a pretense that the President is in
control of the executive branch, including the bureaucracy. It is a pre-
tense that legislation represents the will of the majority of the electo-
rate, or even the will of the majority of senators and congressmen. It is
a pretense that independent agencies are responsible to the legislature
and not the administration, or that administrative law judges are in-
dependent of their agencies. The ideals of our democratic state are rec-
onciled with the facts of life through these fictions. Why should the
Court be an exception to these pretensions? We have long since
learned that democratic principles need play no role in judicial re-
view.5 5 The Court, like the other branches, may justify its behavior in
terms of the Platonic lie.5 6 Or, as Moliere suggests: "If you're still
troubled, think of things this way: No one shall know our joys, save us
alone, And there's no evil till the act is known; It is scandal, Madam,
which makes it an offense, And it's no sin to sin in confidence."57
A more cynical and popular explanation of the Court's coverup of
its sins is that the Court conceals the truth about its behavior because
its revelation would adversely affect public confidence in the role of the
Court. It is the Constitution and not the Court that is revered by the
people. So long as the Court purports to speak as the voice of the Con-
stitution, its decisions will be respected by those who are governed by
them. If the mantle of the Constitution is removed and the ordinary
men concealed behind the black robes are revealed as the framers of
the rules, the Court's authority might be substantially diminished.
Again the argument was well put by Moliere: "In certain cases it
would be uncouth And most absurd to speak the naked truth With all
respect for your exalted notions It is often best to veil one's true emo-
tions Wouldn't the social fabric come undone If we were wholly frank
54. Democracy demands, as does no other form of society, that its citizens understand
their institutions and their problems. Indeed, democracy is dependent upon the perva-
siveness of such understanding among its citizens. .. . Democratic government may
indeed be defined as the government which accepts in the fullest sense the responsibility
to explain itself. It can operate successfully only when statesmen know not merely that
they will be held to account for what they do, but that those who hold them to account
can weigh facts and reflect upon their meaning.
Frankfurter, There Is No Middle Way, SATURDAY REV., Oct. 26, 1946, at 21.
55. See, eg., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCHpassm (1962); E. RosTow, THE
SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 33 (1962).
56. Cf. Kurland, Magna Carta and the Constitution ofthe United States: "The Noble Lie," in
S. THORNE, W. DuNHAM, P. KURLAND, & I. JENNINGS, THE GREAT CHARTER 48 (1965).
57. MOLME,- THE MISANTHROPE, Act 5 (Wilbur trans. 1965).
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with everyone?" 5 Thus, the Court conceals its noninterpretivist be-
havior to preserve the social fabric. It has been said, "Our kind of soci-
ety cannot endure if the controlling authority of the Law as derived
from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal specially charged with
the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is 'the supreme Law of the
Land.' "9 On the other hand, the aristocratic Rochefoucauld pointed
out that "[h]ypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue."60
Obviously, speculation can provide many answers for the Court's
silence about its processes of constitutional deconstruction. Let me of-
fer just one more, the one I find most persuasive, although there are no
more proofs here than are available for the other hypotheses. The posi-
tion that attracts me is not that the Court will not reveal its noninter-
pretive processes but that it cannot reveal them. This is premised on
the notion that constitutional deconstruction proceeds as one literary
critic has described the procedure of other hermeneutics. E.D. Hirsch
in his small, but cogent, book The Aims of Interpretation wrote:
The words of the text alone do not "contain" the meaning to be com-
municated; they institute a spiritual process which, beginning with
the words, ultimately transcends the linguistic medium. Canons of
philological evidence and rules of procedure do not constrain this
intersubjective communion, because understanding is not entirely a
mediated process, but is also a direct speaking of a spirit to a spirit.
The authority of this communion is determined less by philological
investigation than by the vigor of inward conviction, the spiritual
certainty of communion. The process is intuitive, because even
though it is mediated at first by words, it is not constrained, in the
end, by their form.
Intuitionism has a venerable tradition. It is probably the oldest
principle of hermeneutics, being associated from the start with sacred
interpretation. The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life. But since
sometimes only chosen souls have direct access to the spirit behind
the letter, interpretation must be left to the priests who interpret for
other men with instituted authority. ...
It is obvious that any interpretive disagreements based on intui-
tive premises can be resolved only by arbitrary fiat. But such a fiat
could compel our assent only if the spiritual authority of the inter-
preter-priest were widely accepted ... "
Is not this what the Court seems to be telling us in cases like United
States v. Nixon,62 where it repeated a formula that it had used before:
58. MOLIERE, TARUFFE, Act 4, sc. 5 (Wilbur trans. 1965).
59. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
60. LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAxIMs, No. 218 (1665).
61. E. HIRSCH, THE AIMs OF INTERPRETATION 20 (1976).
62. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch
of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the
interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from
the others. . . . Many decisions of this Court, however, have un-
equivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch
137 (1803), that "[iut is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." Id. at 177. . . . Since
this Court has consistently exercised the power to construe and delin-
eate claims arising under express powers, it must follow that the
Court has authority to interpret claims with respect to powers alleged
to be derived from enumerated powers. . . the "judicial power of
the United States" vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the
Constitution can[not] be shared. . . .We therefore reaffirm that it is
the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is."
63
If the Court is made up of the anointed-by reason of their presi-
dential commissions-and it is given to them to "say what the law is,"
we are brought back to Hirsch's proposition that "any interpretive dis-
agreements based on intuitive premises can be resolved only by arbi-
trary flat. But such a fiat could compel our assent only if the spiritual
authority of the interpreter-priest were widely accepted ... 64 The
Court, therefore, does not reveal its noninterpretive processes simply
because, being intuitive, they are not amenable to rational explanation.
("Intuitivism" may also explain the untoward length and the flounder-
ing language of many opinions seeking to explain not the Justices' rea-
sons but their feelings.)
In 1896, Mr. Justice Holmes said as much in his dissent in the
Massachusetts case of Vegelahn v. Gunther:
65
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of so-
cial advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be at-
tained merely by logic and the general propositions of law which
nobody disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely are unani-
mously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of unan-
swerable proof. They require a special training to enable any one
even to form an intelligent opinion about them. In the early stages of
law, at least, they generally are acted on rather as inarticulate instincts
than as defnite ideas for which a rational defence is ready.66
He repeated the proposition in Lochner: "The decision will depend on
a judgment of intuition more subtle than any articulate major prem-
63. Id at 703-05. CF., Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 542-43 (1962) ("the ultimate exposi-
tor of the Constitution'); Powell, Mhat Really Goes on at the Supreme Court, 66 A.B.A.J. 721
(1980) ("to say what the law is").
64. See text & note 61 supra.
65. 167 Mass. 92 (1896).
66. Id at 106 (emphasis added).
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ise."6 7 In sum, to satirize another of Holmes's "apercus," the life of
constitutional law has not been reason, but it has been judicial
intuition.6"
For myself, I am no more satisfied by instinctual or intuitional
constitutional construction than by the many theories of fundamental
values that my academic colleagues have recently come up with in de-
fense of constitutional deconstruction. I am still of the belief that a
written constitution must be more than a declaration of faith to be ex-
plicated by the ordained according to their unexplainable insights.
Let me conclude, then, by reminding you that the question of
deconstruction is an old one. To a degree, the recent contributions to
the subject are no more than an attempted reinvention of the wheel-a
square wheel at that. In large measure, the deconstructionists are sim-
ply supplying excuses rather than justifications for afait accompli, the
expansion of the judicial power. And, like much of the work of the
Court itself, the arguments appeal more to the heart than to the mind.
Many of these recent commentators appear to be the children of the
Age of Aquarius. A Constitution that was the child of the Age of Rea-
son will necessarily be alien to them. In essence, their claim-perhaps
like mine-rests on the divine right of academic lawyers "to say what
the law is." I end then with a couplet from The Dunciad69 "May you,
may Cam and Isis preach it long, The RIGHT DIVINE of kings to govern
wrong."
67. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905).
68. "The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience." 0. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAW 1 (1881).
69. A. POPE, THE DUNCIAD, bk. III, at 187-88 (1743).
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